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WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.; DOES 1-20 
____________________________________ 
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for the District of New Jersey 
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pedro J. Pizarro appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his 
complaint with prejudice and the District Court’s subsequent order denying 
reconsideration.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
 This matter arises from a $165,000 loan that Pizarro received from Washington 
Mutual Bank, FA.  The loan is evidenced by a note and is secured by a mortgage on 
Pizarro’s residence in Hamilton, New Jersey.  Pizarro executed the note and mortgage on 
June 10, 2005.  On April 9, 2007, this mortgage was assigned to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 
(Wells Fargo). 
 Pizarro defaulted on the loan, and Wells Fargo filed a foreclosure action against 
him in New Jersey state court on June 24, 2009.  On September 7, 2016, while the 
foreclosure action was still pending, Pizarro filed this complaint before the District Court.  
In his complaint, Pizarro claims that he has effected rescission of the note and mortgage 
under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) by mailing notice of that rescission to Wells 
Fargo on March 21, 2016.  Pizarro sought a declaration that Wells Fargo consequently 
held no interest in the note or mortgage, an order directing Wells Fargo to return the note 
and mortgage, and a declaration that no other unknown persons (named as Does 1-20 in 
his complaint) held an interest in his residence.1   
Wells Fargo moved to dismiss the complaint.  Oral argument was scheduled for 
January 17, 2017.  At Pizarro’s request, argument was rescheduled for January 24, 2017.  
Pizarro apparently sought again to reschedule argument, but for reasons that are not 
                                              
1 As those Doe defendants were never served, the claims against them are not before us.  
See, e.g., United States v. Studivant, 529 F.2d 673, 674 (3d Cir. 1976). 
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apparent on the record, his efforts failed; argument was held on January 24, and Pizarro 
did not attend.  At the close of argument, the District Court stated that the motion to 
dismiss would be granted, and the Court entered an order to that effect the next day.  
Pizarro then wrote a letter to the Court explaining that his absence from the hearing was a 
result of a misunderstanding and asking for an opportunity to present his case to the 
Court.  The Court granted Pizarro’s request and held argument on February 28, 2017.  
After argument—which Pizarro attended—the Court entered another order.  The Court 
treated Pizarro’s letter as a motion for reconsideration and denied it, concluding, among 
other things, that Pizarro’s claims were time-barred.  Pizarro appealed. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2  Because 
Pizarro’s timely appeal from the denial of his timely motion for reconsideration “brings 
up the underlying judgment for review,” we will review the District Court’s dismissal of 
the complaint as well as its denial of the motion for reconsideration.  See McAlister v. 
Sentry Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 550, 552-53 (3d Cir. 1992).  We review de novo the District 
Court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 519, 529-30 
(3d Cir. 2012).  We review the District Court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration for 
abuse of discretion, but we review any underlying legal determinations de novo.  Howard 
Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2010).   
                                              
2 Although the claims against the Doe defendants appear to be unresolved, the Doe 
defendants are not parties within the meaning of Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, so the District Court’s order is final.  See Studivant, 529 F.2d at 674 n.2. 
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 We will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  At the outset, Pizarro argues that 
the District Court violated his rights by holding the initial hearing on the motion to 
dismiss in his absence.  However, it appears that Pizarro received notice of the hearing 
and just did not attend.  See generally Davis v. Hutchins, 321 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 
2003) (discerning no due-process violation where party “simply did not attend the 
hearing”).  In any case, because the District Court subsequently held a second hearing to 
ensure that Pizarro had an opportunity to be heard (which Pizarro did attend), Pizarro is 
entitled to no relief on this argument. 
Turning to Pizarro’s TILA claims, the transaction between Pizarro and Wells 
Fargo was consummated on the date of closing, June 10, 2005.  See Zaman v. Felton, 98 
A.3d 503, 507-08, 518 (N.J. 2014); Compl. ¶ 19.  Under TILA, Pizarro had three years 
after that to serve defendants with a notice of rescission.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f); 
Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 790, 792-93 (2015).  Section 
1635(f) is a statute of repose that extinguishes not only the ability to seek rescission but 
also the right of rescission itself, and it is not subject to tolling.  See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. 
Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 417 (1998); In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 301 n.18 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  Pizarro did not serve his notice of rescission until more than ten years after 
closing, in 2016.  Thus, his purported rescission was long untimely. 
 Pizarro argues that Wells Fargo may not raise a timeliness defense because it did 
not respond to his notice of rescission within the 20-day time period in 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1635(b).  Section 1635(b) requires a creditor to return any money or property given as 
earnest money or down payment and take other action within 20 days after receipt of a 
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notice of rescission.  § 1635(b).  The provision does not preclude Wells Fargo from 
defending Pizarro’s action.  Pizarro also relies on Jesinoski, but that case does not support 
Pizarro’s argument.  In Jesinoski, the Supreme Court held that a borrower exercising his 
right to rescind need only provide notice to his lender within the three-year period, not 
file suit, 135 S. Ct. at 792-93, but, as we have explained, Pizarro did not give timely 
notice.  Neither Jesinoski nor any other case we have found suggests that a failure to 
respond to an untimely notice of rescission results in the waiver of affirmative defenses in 
a subsequent court proceeding.3 
 Finally, the District Court did not err in denying Pizarro’s motion for 
reconsideration.  In his motion, Pizarro merely reiterated his original arguments or raised 
arguments that could have been raised before; he did not provide a basis for 
reconsideration.  See Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 
669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that reconsideration is appropriate if the moving 
party shows: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new 
evidence not available when the court entered its original order; or (3) that 
reconsideration was necessary to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest 
injustice). 
                                              
3 Because of this conclusion, we need not consider the District Court’s alternative 
grounds for decision (including its application of New Jersey’s preclusion doctrine and 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).  We note only that, because the New Jersey state action 
was ongoing at the time that Pizarro filed his federal complaint, we are satisfied that the 
District Court had jurisdiction.  See generally Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. 
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292–93 (2005). 
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 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
